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From premodal to modal meaning: Adjectival pathways in English




This article approaches common topics in the diachronic literature on modal 
categories from the perspective of adjectives. It thus expands on what has been found 
for the better studied category of modal auxiliaries as regards sources of modal 
meaning and pathways of change. Most importantly, it proposes two new pathways 
from premodal to (dynamic) modal meaning, one followed by essential and vital, and 
one followed by crucial and critical. It also shows that in the four cases the 
development of dynamic meaning depends on the emergence of two semantic 
properties, viz. relationality and potentiality. Finally, this study makes it clear that the 
mechanisms driving the various semantic changes are not new, but rather have 
proved useful in explaining a varied set of developments. For the final semantic 
extension of the adjectives from dynamic to deontic meaning, for instance, the process 
of subjectification (Traugott 1989) will be invoked. 
 
Keywords: modality; semantic change; adjectives; sources; premodal > modal; 
dynamic > deontic 
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1. Introduction 
In the diachronic literature on modal categories, much attention has been devoted to 
verbal forms, especially to modal auxiliaries (e.g., Goossens 1983, 1999; Coates 
1983; Plank 1984; Sweetser 1990: 49–75; Bybee et al. 1994; Hansen 1998, 2004; Van 
der Auwera and Plungian 1998; Diewald 1999; Traugott and Dasher 2002: Ch. 3). In 
general, accounts have focused on three topics, viz. (i) lexical sources of modal forms, 
(ii) pathways of change, and (iii) mechanisms of change, very often in the framework 
of grammaticalization. In this article, I will concentrate on another grammatical 
category expressing modal meaning, viz. adjectives.1 It will become clear that the 
adjectival data add new findings to what has been observed for the lexical and 
semantic sources of modal elements and their pathways of change from descriptive to 
deontic meaning. However, it will also appear that the mechanisms driving the 
semantic changes of the adjectives are not that new, but have been invoked already 
for a diverse set of changes in distinct conceptual domains (cf. Geeraerts 1997: 93–
102). Therefore, I will return to this topic only in the various case-studies of the 
adjectives (Section 4). 
It is generally agreed that modal expressions ultimately derive from non-modal 
elements (e.g. Traugott 2006: 107). The English modal auxiliary can, for instance, has 
developed from the main verb cunnan ‘know (how to)’, just like the modal shall has 
developed from the main verb sculan ‘owe’ (Bybee et al. 1994: 183, 190; Traugott 
and Dasher 2002: 119). Typological studies have shown that these lexical sources are 
cross-linguistically recurrent for expressions of ability and obligation respectively 
(e.g. Bybee et al. 1994; Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998; Heine and Kuteva 2002: 
327, 333). More specifically, for the latter notion, traditionally seen as part and parcel 
of deontic modality, the following sources have been proposed: (i) future-oriented 
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need and desire (with lexical sources need, want), (ii) being or coming into being 
(with lexical sources be, sit, stand, [be]fall), (iii) possession (with lexical sources 
possess, have, get, obtain, catch, owe), (iv) positive evaluation (with lexical sources 
be fitting, good, mete [measure]) (Bybee et al. 1994: 182–183; Traugott and Dasher 
2002: 118–119, Heine and Kuteva 2002: 333). Although the adjectives focused on in 
this article do not encode obligation, they can be used to express the conceptually 
related category of strong desirability, as in (1) (also included within the deontic 
domain by some authors, e.g. Nuyts 2006).  
 
(1)  But quite apart from mediation, it is essential that more explicit recognition is 
given in the Bill to the important role marriage counselling can play in 
exploring the possibility of reconciliation. (CB 1996, times) 
 
It will become clear that not only essential, but also vital, crucial and critical derive 
from very different sources than the ones found for obligation among verbal forms. 
In addition to the semantic and lexical sources of modal categories, diachronic 
studies devoted to the modal domain have concentrated on pathways of change. As 
noted by Traugott (2006: 110), these ‘pathways’, ‘paths’, ‘clines’, or ‘chains’ should 
be interpreted as macro-schemas accommodating overarching types of change (cf. 
Andersen 2001). These schemas typically include focal points, which indicate micro-
steps by which changes occur, like in ability > root possibility > epistemic possibility 
(for the English modal can, for instance). It is assumed that such micro-steps are 
instances of gradual change, with diachronic gradualness corresponding to synchronic 
gradience (see, e.g., Denison 2001). In principle, three types of pathways can be 
distinguished: (i) from premodal to modal meaning, (ii) from one modal to another 
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modal meaning, and (iii), from modal to postmodal meaning. When reviewing the 
literature, it becomes apparent that especially paths of type (ii) have been focused on. 
Language-specific as well as cross-linguistic accounts have generally adduced 
evidence for the agent-oriented/root2 > epistemic pathway (e.g. Heine, Claudi and 
Hünnemeyer 1991; Bybee et al. 1994; Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998; Traugott 
and Dasher 2002: Ch. 3).3 Paths of type (iii) still have received some attention (e.g. 
Bybee et al. [1994: 212–225] on the development of “subordinating moods”, and Van 
der Auwera and Plungian [1998: 104–110] on “demodalization”), but those of type (i) 
have hardly been investigated. In this article, I will detail the semantic development of 
four adjectives from their original non-modal meaning to dynamic meaning and 
further to deontic meaning. I will present two new pathways from premodal to 
(dynamic) modal meaning, each exemplified by two adjectives. 
The structure of this article is as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the modal 
notions referred to in this study and discusses the data and the corpora used. Section 3 
concentrates on the lexical sources of deontic adjectives. Section 4 discusses the 
semantic developments of essential, vital, crucial and critical. It distinguishes 
between the changes from premodal to modal meaning, and those within the modal 
domain. Whereas in the latter case the dynamic-deontic development mirrors that of 
modal verbs, the developments leading to dynamic meaning offer new insights. I 
argue that the development of this modal meaning involves (the emergence of) two 
properties in the semantic make-up of the adjectives, which are called ‘relationality’ 
and ‘potentiality’. Relationality is needed to turn the adjective into a predicate of 
necessity that can link two concepts, for instance a part and a whole, or a condition 
and a goal. Potentiality is needed to ensure that the relationship established by the 
adjective is one of indispensability, which gives rise to dynamic meaning. Although 
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all four adjectives differ in the way they develop these properties, it proves possible to 
generalize over the four cases and I propose two pathways of change from premodal 
to modal meaning. In Section 5, finally, I recapitulate the main findings and propose 
questions for further reflection.  
 
2. Modal notions and data 
The modal notions central to this article are dynamic and deontic modality. Dynamic 
modality traditionally involves ascribing an ability or capacity to the subject 
participant of a clause (e.g. von Wright 1951b: 28). However, this definition has been 
felt to be too narrow, and it has been extended to all indications of 
abilities/possibilities, or needs/necessities inherent in participants of actions (which 
are not necessarily syntactic subjects) or in situations (e.g. Palmer 1979: 3–4, Ch. 5–6, 
1990: Ch. 5–6; Perkins 1983: 11–12; Nuyts 2005, 2006).4 It is especially the 
situational subtype that can be expressed by the adjectives studied here, as in (2).  
 
(2)  This should make you want to go to the toilet frequently. Although it may sting 
the first few times you go, this usually gets better the more water you pass. It 
is essential to keep emptying the bladder if you are to flush out the germs. (CB 
1992, ukepehm) 
 
Situational dynamic modality involves the indication of “a potential or a 
necessity/inevitability inherent in the situation described in the clause as a whole” 
(Nuyts 2006: 4). In (2), the speaker describes the need to keep emptying the bladder 
in order to flush out the germs (note the condition-goal paraphrase). Importantly, the 
speaker does not express his/her personal opinion, but rather a natural law-like truth: 
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the need or necessity originates in the physical make-up of the human body. Example 
(2) thus expresses a necessity that is internal to the State of Affairs (SoA) described in 
the clause. 
Deontic modality, in turn, has traditionally been defined in terms of obligation and 
permission (von Wright 1951a, 1951b: 36, 1971; Lyons 1977: 823–841; Kratzer 
1978: 111; Palmer 1979: Ch. 4, 1986: 96–115; Goossens 1985: 204; Van der Auwera 
and Plungian 1998: 81). However, Nuyts (2006: 4) has proposed a more general 
definition as “an indication of the degree of moral desirability of the state of affairs 
expressed in the utterance”, which does not necessarily involve obligation or 
permission. In fact, the adjectives studied never encode obligation or permission, but 
they can be used to express someone’s (viz. of the attitudinal source) commitment to 
an SoA in terms of his/her moral principles. These principles are invariably external 
to the SoA assessed in the expression, as in (3). 
 
(3)  Herbert Daniels, the group's founder, believes that it is essential to overcome 
the social stigma of Aids, which often means that people with the virus lose 
their homes, jobs and families, and are effectively condemned to death by 
society. (CB 1990, bbc) 
 
In (3), the (reported) speaker does not impose an obligation, but rather expresses his 
commitment to overcoming the social stigma of Aids on the basis of moral grounds. 
Unlike in (2), therefore, essential expresses SoA-external necessity in (3). 
In addition to essential, illustrated in (1) to (3), this article focuses on three other 
adjectives that were borrowed into English with a non-modal descriptive sense, viz. 
vital, crucial and critical. These adjectives were searched for in the electronic version 
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of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) to find information on their etymology. In 
addition, I used its general quotation database, in which nearly all quotations are 
precisely dated and thus very helpful in tracking the semantic development of the 
adjectives in question. In addition to the OED, I also used the set of diachronic and 
synchronic corpora presented in Table 1 below, to corroborate the findings. It should 
be noted, though, that in some cases I found a considerable time lag between the first 
attestation of a use in the OED and its occurrence in the corpus data. 
 
Table 1: The corpora used for each subperiod and their number of words  








Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Middle 
English, Second Edition (PPCME) 1.16 




Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Early 
Modern English (PPCEME) 1.79 
Late Modern English  
(LModE) 1710–1920 
Corpus of Late Modern English texts 
(Extended version) (CLMETEV)  
(De Smet 2005, 2008) 
15.01 





Collins COBUILD corpus (CB) 
(only British subcorpora) 42.10 
 
3. Sources of deontic modality 
Several cross-linguistically recurrent sources have already been proposed for the 
notion of obligation (for an inventory, see Section 1). Among these, expressions of 
positive evaluation are relevant to English, as complex constructions with adjectives 
such as appropriate can be used to express deontic meaning, as in (4). However, they 
express a weaker degree of desirability than the adjectives studied here.  
 
(4)  You can indulge the shortcomings of a friend a certain number of times and 
then, unwittingly, they go over the limit. You tot everything up and, (…) there 
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comes a point when you decide that in total they are unforgivable and can no 
longer be overlooked. (…) Sometimes it may be wholly appropriate not to 
forgive or forget. (CB 1993, ukmags) 
 
A set of such ‘weak(er)’ English adjectives can even be traced further back to other 
sources listed in Section 1. The adjectives proper and appropriate, for instance, 
etymologically involve the notion of possession (cf. OED, s.v. proper and 
appropriate).5 The adjectives fitting (and possibly also fit) and meet, in turn, relate to 
the notion of measure (cf. OED, s.v. fitting, fit and meet).6 
However, it has also been acknowledged that the inventory of sources for the 
notion of obligation is not exhaustive (e.g. Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 91). 
The adjectives I am concerned with here, which express a strong degree of desirability 
in the deontic domain, derive from sources very different from the ones mentioned 
above. For example, essential, borrowed into English from Latin in the 15th century, is 
an adaptation of the Late Latin word essentialis, which in turn derives from the noun 
essentia ‘essence’ (OED, s.v. essential). Vital, which entered the English language in 
the 14th century, also derives from a noun, viz. Latin vita ‘life’ (note that according to 
the OED its precise etymology is not very clear: either it is adopted from Old French 
vital, or it is an adaptation of the Latin form vitalis).7 Crucial and critical ultimately 
derive from nouns as well. Crucial, borrowed from French in the 18th century, is 
based on the Latin form crux ‘cross’ (OED, s.v. crucial). Critical, finally, goes back 
to the Greek noun krivsi" ‘judgement, crisis’, via the derived adjective krivsimo" or 
kritikov" (Liddell et al. 1951 [1924]: i 997a), which was first borrowed into Latin as 
criticus, and in the 16th century into English as critic (OED, s.v. critic and critical). 
Morphologically, the adjectives studied thus all are derivations from a nominal base. 
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Semantically, the nominal sources refer to either abstract notions (essence, life and 
judgement/crisis) or concrete entities (cross), which are not included in the set of 
sources given above. The adjectives essential, vital, crucial and critical therefore 
present us with additional sources for deontic meaning.8 
 
4. Pathways of semantic change 
This section concentrates on the semantic development of the four adjectives studied 
here. In Section 4.1, I will discuss changes from premodal to modal meaning, which 
have been largely under-researched so far (cf. Section 1). I will present two new 
pathways of change towards dynamic meaning, which share the emergence of two 
semantic properties, viz. relationality and potentiality. In Section 4.2, I will discuss a 
change within the modal domain common to all four adjectives, viz. that from 
dynamic to deontic meaning, which has also been observed for modal auxiliaries such 
as can, must and may. In general, I will show that the development of the lexical items 
cannot be dissociated from the constructions they appear in, which are broadly 
understood here as including patterns of co-occurrence and patterns of (prepositional 
or clausal) complementation. As with the modal auxiliaries, the lexicon-syntax 
interface thus plays an important role in the semantic development of the adjectives as 
well. It will also turn out that the mechanisms driving the semantic changes are not 
specific to the adjectival developments either. 
 
4.1 Changes from premodal to modal meaning 
If we take a closer look at the semantic development of essential, vital, crucial and 
critical, we can distinguish between two pathways from premodal to modal meaning. 
I will first discuss the developments of essential (Section 4.1.1) and vital (Section 
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4.1.2), and I will argue that these mark a first pathway to dynamic meaning (Section 
4.1.3). Then I will present the developments of crucial (Section 4.1.4) and critical 
(Section 4.1.5), which came later into the English language (see Section 3), and 
propose a second pathway on the basis of these findings (Section 4.1.6). Both 
pathways will be described in terms of the properties of relationality and potentiality, 
which are the semantic prerequisites for dynamic meaning to emerge. In addition, as 
suggested by a referee, it will become clear that the adjectives comply with the 
tendency noted by Paradis (2001: 58) for non-gradable items to develop into gradable 
ones.  
 
4.1.1 Essential from premodal to dynamic meaning.9 This section concentrates on the 
semantic developments of essential towards dynamic meaning. As proposed in Table 
2 below, we can hypothesize three stages, which are the result of two semantic 
changes. The first change is that from its original meaning to a relational type of 
meaning, which is termed ‘defining necessity’. The second change is that to 
(situational) dynamic modal meaning, for which the development of the feature of 
potentiality is crucial. It will also become clear that the main driving factors of the 
changes are patterns of co-occurrence. 
 
Table 2: The development of essential from premodal to modal meaning (cf. Van 
linden et al. 2008: 240, Table 2) 






First attestation   → c1440 1596  1618 
Meaning and 
examples            → 
‘being such by its 
true nature’ 
(5) 






relationality - + + 
potentiality - - + 
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As can be seen in Table 2, the original meaning of essential in English is not 
relational, nor potential. It can be paraphrased as ‘being such by its true nature’, or 
‘being such in the true sense of the word’. The OED gives “that is such by essence, or 
in the absolute or highest sense” (OED, s.v. essential). An example is given in (5). 
 
(5) For þe souerayne and þe Escencyalle Ioy es in  þe lufe of Godd  
for the sovereign and the essential    joy is in  the love of God  
by hym-selfe and for hym-selfe, and þe  secundarye es in  comonynge  
by himself   and for himself,  and the  secondary  is in  communing  
and byhaldynge of Aungells and gastely creaturs.  
and beholding  of angels   and ghostly creatures 
‘For the sovereign and the essential joy is in the love of God by himself and 
for himself, and the secondary (joy) is in the communing and the beholding of 
Angels and ghostly creatures’ (PPCME c1440 ?Rolle þi ioy [Thrn] 17) 
 
In (5), the adjective essential, like secondary, indicates a type of joy. In this sense, it 
functions as a classifier and not as an attribute of the noun joy.10 Semantically, 
classifiers denote a subtype of the more general type referred to by the head noun, and 
“tend to be organized in mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets” of that general type 
(Halliday 1994: 185). In fact, the two types of joy in (5) are opposed to each other, 
and thus presented as mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets of joy: essential joy 
(meaning ‘true’, ‘basic’, ‘substantial’ or ‘primary’ joy) versus secondary joy (meaning 
‘derived’, ‘accidental’ joy). 
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The first semantic extension of essential on its pathway to dynamic meaning 
involves the development of relational meaning (cf. Table 2). This type of meaning is 
illustrated in (6) below. 
 
(6) Sensibility and a locomotive faculty are essentiall to every living creature. 
(OED 1656 Bramhall, A replication to the bishop of Chalcedon i. 5)  
 
In (6), sensibility and a locomotive faculty are said to constitute the essence of every 
living creature. This use of essential is relational because it does not indicate a type of 
something (e.g., a type of joy as in [5]), but serves to relate two concepts, viz. 
sensibility/locomotion and life. Whereas the original sense of essential is still 
taxonomic, in that it applies to types, the relational meaning is clearly partonomic, in 
that it applies to parts in relation to a whole. This change is also reflected in the 
syntactic potential of the adjective: it is not a classifier, but now functions as an 
attribute in predicative position, and it can take a prepositional complement. In 
addition, it has changed from a non-gradable to a gradable item: in examples such as 
(6) essential can take totality modifiers such as absolutely (cf. Paradis 2001: 50–53). 
It has been shown that the diachronic bridge between the original classifier use in 
(5) and the later relational use in (6) can be found in structures in which the classifier 
co-occurs with relational nouns like property, attribute or part (Van linden et al. 
2008: 232–234), as in (7) and (8) below.11  
 
(7)  Heate is the essentiall propertie of fire (OED 1620 Granger, Syntagma 
logicum, or the divine logike 66) 
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(8)  Mercy as it is Radically in God and an essentiall attribute of his. (OED a1631 
Donne, Sermons [1953] VI. 170)  
 
In these examples, essential functions as a classifier with the relational nouns 
property and attribute, which denote a part within a larger whole. This pattern of co-
occurrence with relational nouns is decisive for the development of relational 
meaning of the adjective itself: with relational nouns, the paraphrase proposed for the 
original use of essential in (5) cannot be applied anymore. In (7), for instance, 
essentiall propertie does not mean ‘that is a property in the true sense of the word’, or 
‘that is a property by its true nature’. Rather, the part-whole relationship in the 
background of property provides a better paraphrase: ‘a property of the essence of 
fire’, or ‘a property constituting the essence of fire’. In this sense, it can be argued that 
relational nouns like property or attribute, which are based on a part-whole or 
inclusion relationship, are semantically permeable and therefore able to transfer their 
relational property to the adjectives that classify them.   
The semantic permeability of the relational nouns actually implies that the 
meaning of essential in expressions such as (7) and (8) is relational as well. In (7), for 
instance, essential links heat with fire, as heat is said to constitute the essence of fire, 
and in (7), it links mercy with God, as mercifulness is argued to constitute the essence 
of God. Thus, heat is essential to fire, and mercy is essential to God. In (7) and (8), 
then, essential establishes a relation of inclusion between two concepts, just like in 
(6). As can be seen in (6), later relational uses of essential do not necessarily involve 
relational nouns: it has merely been argued that co-occurrence with relational nouns 
(i.e. classifier relational uses) is a facilitating factor that forms a diachronic bridge 
between classifier non-relational uses and non-classifier relational uses. 
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As indicated in Table 2, the type of meaning expressed by relational uses of 
essential is called ‘defining necessity’ (cf. Van linden et al. 2008: 234). In fact, if 
certain properties or attributes are said to constitute the essence of something, they are 
necessary to it, for otherwise we might be dealing with just something else. 
Importantly, this type of necessity differs from the classic dynamic-modal type of 
necessity, i.e. the necessity we experience when something is needed for a certain 
purpose. The second semantic change in the development of essential then is the 
extension from the sense of defining necessity to that of dynamic necessity, in which 
the property of potentiality plays a key role (cf. Table 2). 
What distinguishes the two types of necessity is the notion of definition. The first 
type of necessity obviously is defining in nature, whereas the second type is not. 
Example (7), for instance, can be paraphrased as ‘fire is (necessarily) hot’, and (8) as 
‘God is (necessarily) merciful’. In these paraphrases, the predicates do not add any 
new information to the subject, but rather define it. Being hot, for example, is a 
defining feature of fire. In this sense, the paraphrases are analytical propositions, in 
which subject and predicate are linked by virtue of their intension. Furthermore, what 
is regarded as necessary in a defining way (e.g., mercy as necessary to God in [8]) is 
intrinsically present in it.12 Finally, defining necessity applies to all instances of the 
type designated by the head noun to which something is said to be necessary: all fires, 
for instance, are hot.  
Dynamic (modal) necessity, on the other hand, has very different semantic 
characteristics. Consider the following example.  
 
 15
(9)  And practice, though essential to perfection, can never attain that to which it 
aims, unless it works under the direction of principle. (CLMETEV 1776 
Reynolds, Seven discourses on art)  
 
In (9), ‘practice’ is not defining of ‘perfection’. The example is a synthetic 
proposition, in which the predicate is not linked to the subject by virtue of its 
intension, but adds new information about the subject. Furthermore, dynamic 
necessity does not really signal an inherent presence, such as the presence of mercy in 
God in (8), but rather the absence of something that is desirable for a particular 
purpose, such as ‘practice’ in (9). The subtype of dynamic meaning involved here 
thus is situational in the sense defined in Section 2: the necessity of ‘practice’ is 
inherent in the situation of reaching perfection, with the necessity being indicated on 
the basis of SoA-internal grounds. Finally, as this type of necessity is not defining in 
nature, it does not necessarily apply to all instances of the type designated by the head 
noun to which something is said to be essential.  
The semantic extension of essential from the sense of defining necessity to that of 
dynamic necessity can be attributed to the emergence of an element of potentiality. 
Corpus examples such as (9) show that the potential element can originate in the fact 
that the element to which something is said to be essential is a potential action, viz. 
reaching the state of perfection. Clearly, the action representing the goal is potential: 
it has not yet been realized, but it can be realized at some point in the future. 
However, the earliest constructions in which potentiality emerges are expressions 
in which the element to which something is said to be essential is modified by an 
evaluative adjective. They appear in the early 17th century, not much later than the 
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first relational (but non-potential) uses (1596). Examples are given below; example 
(10) is the first attestation in the OED. 
 
(10)  It is an essentiall property of a man truly wise, not to open all the boxes of his 
bosome. (OED a1618 Ralegh, Remains, viz. Maxims of state, Advice to his son 
[1664] 89) 
(11)  Government is essential to formed and regular Societies. (OED 1681–1686 
Scott, The christian life [1747] III. 386) 
 
In these examples, the nouns to which a particular feature is said to be essential (man 
in [10], societies in [11]) are modified by evaluative adjectives. These adjectives 
indicate that the predication of being essential does not apply to all instances of the 
type designated by those nouns, but only to a subjectively defined subset of them. The 
type of subjectivity intended here is the one involving the speaker’s evaluation of an 
entity, i.e. the description of a content based in the speaker’s subjective attitude 
towards the situation (De Smet and Verstraete 2006: 385).13 This type of subjective 
meaning gives rise to potential meaning. In (10), for instance, the property of not 
opening all the boxes of your bosom is said to be an essential property of truly wise 
men (only), so not of just every man. The property actually serves as a criterion for a 
man to be taken up in the privileged subset of truly wise men, or, in other words, if 
you want to be considered a truly wise man, you should not open all the boxes of your 
bosom. Example (11) can in turn be paraphrased as ‘in order for a society to be 
considered formed and regular, it should have government, or it should be governed’. 
These condition-goal paraphrases make it clear that evaluative adjectives bring with 
them the notion of dynamic (situational) necessity. The examples (9) to (11) thus 
show that the extension of essential to evaluative contexts and contexts of potential 
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action implies a semantic extension of the adjective: the relationship established by it 
has been extended from one of intrinsic inclusion (in contexts of defining necessity) 
to one of indispensability (in contexts of dynamic necessity). 
In conclusion, in the development from premodal to (dynamic) modal meaning, 
essential first acquired relational meaning through co-occurrence with relational 
nouns, and came to express defining necessity. Later on, co-occurrence with 
evaluative adjectives and potential actions drove the development of potential 
meaning, and the extension from intrinsic inclusion to indispensability or dynamic 
necessity. It is not surprising that the earliest examples of potential meaning were 
found in evaluative contexts, as these are still close to defining contexts because of 
the inclusion relationship between the two entities linked by essential (e.g. properties 
of men in [10]). Contexts of potential action, by contrast, are both diachronically (cf. 
[9]) and semantically further ‘removed’ from defining contexts, because they have 
given up the inclusion relationship at all. 
 
4.1.2. Vital from premodal to dynamic meaning. In the semantic development of vital 
to dynamic meaning, we can also distinguish between three stages as the result of two 
changes. As shown in Table 3, the first stage involves its original meaning, which is 
already relational, but yet non-modal. I will discuss three different subsenses; the first 
semantic change involves the generalization of one specific subsense, viz. that in the 
collocation vital parts, which gives rise to the meaning of defining necessity (like 
essential in its second stage). The second semantic change is that to dynamic 
meaning, in which again the property of potentiality emerges. Like in the case of 
essential, this change occurs through the extension to contexts of evaluation and 
potential action. However, the chronology of the first attestations of the senses in 
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stages 2 and 3 requires us to regard the development sketched here as merely a 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 3: The development of vital from premodal to modal meaning 






First attestation    → 1386 1647 1619 
Meaning and 
examples             → 
‘associated with life 
or the heart’; 










relationality + + + 
potentiality - - + 
 
In its earliest attestations in the OED and the historical corpora, vital is used in 
three distinct senses. The data do not provide a decisive answer as to which sense is 
the original one in English, or whether these senses developed out of one another. As 
these questions are not immediately relevant to the development of modal meaning, 
they are not discussed in further detail. 
The first attestation of vital dates from 1386, and involves the general sense of 
‘associated with life’. The OED gives a more specific definition: “consisting in, 
constituted by, that immaterial force or principle which is present in living beings or 
organisms and by which they are animated and their functions maintained” (OED, s.v. 
vital). The example is given in (12) below.  
 
(12)  In hise armes two The vital strengthe is lost, and al ago. 
 in his  arms  two the  vital strength  is lost, and all agone 
 ‘In his two arms the vital strength is lost and all gone.’ (OED c1386 Chaucer, 
Knight's Tale 1994) 
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A second sense of vital appears not much later in the OED data (1450), and is also 
covered by the ‘associated with life’ paraphrase. In this case also, a more specific 
definition can be put forward, in which vital is associated with the physiology of the 
ancient Greek physician Galen (129–199 AC) (TLF XVI: 1210a). Building on Plato’s 
tripartite nature of the soul, consisting of a vegetative, sensitive and rational soul 
(Knoeff 2004: 419), Galen distinguished between three systems, each of which is 
located in different organs and has a distinct set of virtues and faculties (Siraisi 1990: 
107). In later Galenic thought, these systems were called the natural, vital and animal 
system, the principal parts of which are the liver, heart and brain respectively (Siraisi 
1990: 107–108). Galenic physiology and pneumatology persisted into the 17th century 
(Forrester 2002), which is reflected in the OED data. In the Middle and Early Modern 
English data, vital is found in collocation with nouns such as spirit(s), blood, heat, 
virtue and faculty, with the specific meaning of ‘associated with the heart’. In these 
collocations, as in (13), vital does not assign a gradable quality, but rather functions as 
a classifier, as it indicates a specific subtype of a more general type (e.g. spirit), in 
opposition with natural and animal. 
 
(13)  The Spirit Vitall in the  Hert  doth dwell, The Spirit Naturall…  
the spirit vital  in the  heart  does dwell,  the  spirit natural   
in the  Liver…, but  Spirit Animall dwelleth  in the Braine. 
in the  liver,   but  spirit animal  dwells   in the brain 
‘The vital spirit dwells in the heart, the natural spirit in the liver, but the 




It can be argued that in the sense of ‘associated with life (or the heart)’, vital 
already has a relational meaning (cf. Table 3): it evokes a relationship with ‘life’. In 
this sense, it can be paraphrased as ‘essential to life’, with essential used in a defining 
way. Vital strength, for instance, is a strength that is intrinsically present in life, or 
more specifically in living creatures and organisms. Likewise, the vital spirit is 
intrinsically present in life. At least in that particular Weltanschauung, it constitutes 
the essence of life, and every living human being has it by definition. The senses of 
vital in vital strength and vital spirit thus both imply a relationship of intrinsic 
inclusion.  
The third non-modal sense of vital is found in collocations with the relational 
noun part(s), and its first example in the OED dates from 1565. Arguably, this 
collocation was used in a Galenic and a modern sense. In the Galenic sense, the term 
vital parts referred to the organs of the Galenic vital system, viz. the organs in the 
thoracic cavity and the arteries (Siraisi 1990: 107). This sense is illustrated in example 
(14) below, in which the vital parts are opposed to the parts of the natural system, 
which were also called the ‘nourishing parts’. Again, vital is used as a classifier, 
indicating a type of parts. In the modern sense, the referents of the collocation do not 
belong to the vital system only, but also to the animal and natural system. In this 
sense, vital also functions as a classifier. However, it is not opposed to 
natural/nourishing or animal, as in the Galenic sense, but rather to non-vital. Vital 
parts are organs without which we cannot live, such as the heart, lungs, brains and 
liver, whereas non-vital parts are those which can be missed, such as the milt, uterus 
and eyes. This modern sense is illustrated in example (15), and is clearly of a later 
date than the Galenic example. However, both senses can be paraphrased by ‘essential 
to life’, with essential used in a defining way. According to the Galenic 
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Weltanschauung on the one hand and that of modern medicine on the other, these 
parts are intrinsically present in life, or, to put it differently, without these parts, there 
is no life. 
 
(14)  There is a partition called diaphragma by the Græcians, which separateth the 
instruments of the vital partes, from the nourishing parts. (OED 1594 Bowes, 
De La Primaudaye's French academie II. 220) 
(15)  The Vital Parts are the Heart, Brain, Lungs and Liver. (OED 1696 Phillips, 
The new world of English words: or, a general dictionary [ed. 5] s.v. vital) 
 
The first semantic change of vital involves semantic generalization, in which vital 
loses its connection with ‘life’ and comes to express defining necessity (cf. Table 3).14 
This generalization starts from its collocation with parts, and extends the relationship 
of intrinsic inclusion within ‘life’ to that of intrinsic inclusion within basically 
anything that is more or less composite in nature. The hypothesis that the 
generalization occurred prior to rather than simultaneous with the development of 
potential meaning is suggested by examples in which vital is found with nouns 
referring to abstract concepts that are fairly homogeneous in substance, much like the 
relational non-potential examples found with essential, viz. (7) and (8) above. 
Examples with vital are given in (16) and (17). We can note that they also show 
structural reflections of its relational meaning: the elements to which something is 
said to be vital are coded by of-PPs (the same goes for [18] below). In addition, vital 
has become gradable, as it can combine with totality modifiers such as absolutely (cf. 
Paradis 2001: 50–53). 
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(16)  Their submiss Reverence to their Princes being a vital part of their 
Religion; (OED 1647 Clarendon, The history of the rebellion and civil wars in 
England I. §76) 
(17)  If these he has mentioned be the substantial and vital parts [of his theory, 
OED]. (OED 1698 Keill, An examination of Dr. Burnet's Theory of the earth 
[1734] 181) 
 
In these examples, vital co-occurs with the relational noun part, but it bears no 
relation to ‘life’ anymore. Instead, vital is used in its generalized sense, as it refers to 
essential parts of a religion or theory. It can be argued that vital is used here in a 
defining way, as the religion in (16) and the theory in (17) would not be the same 
anymore if the vital parts were changed or removed. In other words, these parts are 
intrinsically present in the religion or theory, and constitute their essence. 
The second semantic change of vital involves the development of the property of 
potentiality (cf. Table 3). Like in the case of essential, this property — and hence, 
dynamic meaning — first emerges in examples in which the noun to which something 
is said to be vital is modified by an evaluative adjective.15 As discussed in Section 
4.1.1, such adjectives indicate that the predication does not apply to all instances of 
the type designated by that noun, but only to a subjectively defined subset of these. 
An example is given below.  
 
(18) The three vital circumstances of a well-ordered Action, Person, Time and 
Place. (OED 1619 Lushington, The resurrection rescued from the soldiers' 
calumnies [1659] 70) 
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This example is similar to that with essential and an evaluative adjective, like in (10) 
and (11) above. In (18), the three circumstances listed are essential or necessary only 
to a potential or subjectively defined subset of actions, viz. well-ordered actions. In 
other words, in order for an action to be considered well-ordered, it should be 
characterized by the circumstances of person, time and place. This condition-goal 
paraphrase suggests that the evaluative adjective well-ordered imposes a potential 
interpretation on vital. It should also be noted that here the relationship established by 
vital is not one of intrinsic inclusion, but rather one of indispensability.  
Later, the property of potentiality is also found in examples in which some 
element is said to be vital to a particular potential action. Example (19) bears a close 
resemblance to (9) above, in which essential is used with a potential action.    
 
(19)  Hence it was that the raising of the siege of Gibeon…was so vital to the 
conquest of Canaan. (OED 1856 Stanley, Sinai and Palestine in connection 
with their history iv. 215) 
 
In (19), raising the siege of Gibeon is said to have been vital or necessary in order to 
conquer Canaan. Again, the condition-goal paraphrase and the SoA-internal character 
of the necessity make it clear that the type of meaning involved is situational dynamic 
modality. Clearly, the relation that vital establishes is one of indispensability. The 
meaning of vital has thus been extended from defining to dynamic necessity in the 
course of the 17th century.  
To conclude, it can be hypothesized that the development of vital from premodal 
to modal meaning first involved semantic generalization. The three subsenses found 
in the earliest attestations of vital all already implied a relationship of intrinsic 
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inclusion within ‘life’, which can be explained by the etymology of vital (ultimately 
based on Latin vita, ‘life’). The semantic generalization preserved this type of 
relationship and yielded the meaning of essential used in a defining way. The 
connection with ‘life’, however, got lost. In a second change, driven by patterns of co-
occurrence with evaluative adjectives and potential actions, vital developed dynamic 
meaning, involving the property of potentiality and a relationship of indispensability 
instead of intrinsic inclusion. Like in the case of essential, evaluative contexts 
appeared earlier than those with potential actions. Again, therefore, the data have 
shown that the properties of relationality and potentiality are the semantic conditions 
of the development of dynamic meaning.  
 
4.1.3 A first pathway to dynamic meaning: essential and vital. From the previous 
discussions, we can infer that the semantic developments of essential and vital show 
more similarities than differences. They thus allow us to propose a first pathway to 






Figure 1: The first pathway to dynamic meaning: essential and vital 
 
As can be seen in the figure, the main difference between the two concerns the 
beginning of the pathway. Remember that in its original meaning essential is non-
relational, whereas vital does not have a non-relational stage. However, both 
essential:  
‘being such by 











adjectives share a stage of defining necessity and later develop the meaning of 
dynamic necessity. In both cases, the development of this modal meaning involves 
first patterns of co-occurrence with evaluative adjectives, and later contexts of 
potential actions. The adjectives essential and vital therefore present us with a first 
pathway to dynamic meaning via the notion of defining necessity. In the following 
sections, I will put forward a second pathway, for which the adjectives crucial and 
critical are exemplary. Both pathways not only mark a development from descriptive 
to modal items, but also from non-gradable to gradable items. 
 
4.1.4 Crucial from premodal to dynamic meaning.16 This section focuses on the 
development from premodal to modal meaning of crucial, in which four stages can be 
recognized, which are, however, not as clear-cut as is the case for essential and vital. 
Table 4 hypothesizes what these stages may look like.  
 
Table 4: The development of crucial from premodal to modal meaning (cf. Van 
linden et al. 2008: 244, Table 3) 













First attestation    → 1706 1830 1830 1869 
Meaning and 

















relationality - - + + 
potentiality - - + + 
 
It will become clear that the distinction between the second and third stage is not hard 
and fast. In fact, these two stages coincide temporally due to the first semantic 
change, which is a metaphorical projection. I have disentangled these stages to be able 
to assign the same configuration of semantic properties to the source and target 
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meaning of the metaphor. The second change, which is driven by semantic 
generalization, leads to the development of dynamic meaning. 
As the original meaning of crucial in English, the OED (s.v. crucial) mentions 
‘cross-shaped’ or ‘in the form of a cross’. Its first attestations in the OED are given 
below.  
 
(20)  Crucial Incision, the cutting or lancing of an Impostume or Swelling 
cross~wise. (OED 1706 Phillips, The new world of English words: or, a 
general dictionary [ed. Kersey] s.v. Incision) 
(21)  The bursal and crucial ligaments were in their natural order. (OED 1751 
Phil. Trans. XLVII. xxxvii. 261) 
 
Both in (20) and (21), crucial functions as a classifier. In (20), it indicates a specific 
type of incision in the form of a cross, as opposed to a linear incision. In (21), crucial 
denotes a sub-class of ligaments, viz. those in the knee-joint that cross each other in 
the form of a Saint Andrew’s cross and connect the femur and tibia, as opposed to the 
bursal ligaments, which cross the bursa (OED, s.v. crucial and bursal). In both cases, 
crucial indicates a subtype of the general type of the head noun, and does not attribute 
a gradable quality to the NP referent. More generally, the OED database does not 
contain any predicative or graded uses of crucial in its original meaning. It is clear 
that crucial in the sense of ‘cross-shaped’ or ‘cross-like’ is non-relational, since it 
does not link two concepts, and non-potential, since it does not involve a potential 
event or the potential presence of an entity (cf. Table 4).  
The first semantic change of crucial on its way to dynamic meaning involves 
metaphorical projection. It is commonly accepted that the basis of this metaphorical 
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extension was laid in the work of Francis Bacon (1561–1626) (OED, s.v. crucial; 
FEW II2: 1382b; TLF VI: 559; Klein 1971: 178; Barnhart 1988: 238a). In his very 
influential Novum Organum (1620), written in Latin, Bacon coined the phrase 
instantia crucis ‘crucial instance’, which he explained as a metaphor derived from 
crosses that are placed at bifurcations of the road and indicate where each road will 
lead. Crucial instances are places where the scientist or thinker in general has to make 
a decision, as much as finger-posts are places where the traveller has to decide which 
way to go17 (the Latin word crux at that time had developed the meaning of ‘a 
guidepost that gives directions at a place where one road becomes two’ [OED, s.v. 
crucial; FEW II2: 1380a]).18 Bacon thus mapped the more concrete domain of 
travelling onto the more abstract domain of thinking. Robert Boyle (1627–1691) and 
Isaac Newton (1642–1727) built on this metaphor and used the term experimentum 
crucis to refer to the experiment performed to decide between two rival hypotheses 
(OED, s.v. crucial). Although the studies of the scientists mentioned were written in 
the 17th or early 18th century (some in Latin), the specific phrases with the adjective 
crucial appeared in English only in the 19th century.19 The earliest example is given in 
(22) below. 
 
(22) What Bacon terms crucial instances, which are phenomena brought forward 
to decide between two causes, each having the same analogies in its favour. 
(OED 1830 Herschel, A preliminary discourse on the study of natural 
philosophy II. vi. 150)  
 
The definitions of crucial instance (in [22]) and crucial experiment (described above) 
make it clear that these fixed phrases have relational and potential meaning as a 
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whole, since the consideration of a ‘finger-post-like’ type of instance or the 
performance of such a type of experiment is necessary in order to decide between 
rival hypotheses, and ultimately to resolve the intellectual crisis. (Note that crucial 
functions as a classifier of its collocates.) Arguably, it is only in the specific 
collocations with instance and experiment that crucial has relational and potential 
meaning, which is another reason why Table 4 distinguishes between stages 2 and 3. 
In any case, the condition-goal paraphrases imply that the collocations involve 
dynamic situational necessity, just like essential and vital in their third stage.  
The second semantic change takes place when the use of crucial is extended to 
other contexts than the collocations with instance and experiment, and concomitantly, 
the specific meaning of ‘necessary to decide between two hypotheses’ is generalized 
to ‘decisive for’ or ‘important for’ (cf. Table 4). Whereas crucial only has this 
specific meaning in the collocations with instance and experiment, in which it 
functions as a classifier, it retains a more general meaning of ‘important’ or ‘decisive’ 
when used in modifying other nouns. Semantically, in such other contexts, it is 
crucial itself that has relational and potential meaning, and not the combination of the 
adjective and the noun. This is structurally reflected by the occurrence of 
complements (see [23] and [24]). Syntactically, it no longer functions as a classifier, 
but as an attribute: it is gradable, and it can be used in predicative position (see [24]). 
Example (23) illustrates the semantic generalization of crucial. Even if it modifies the 
noun experiments, we can still argue for a general attribute reading, since the potential 
action to which the experiment is considered crucial needs to be expressed; if crucial 
experiments had been used in its specific collocational sense, the for-complement 
would have been redundant. The type of relationship established by crucial is one of 
decisive importance or determining influence. 
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(23) Crucial experiments for the verification of his theory. (OED 1869 Martineau, 
Essays philosophical and theological II. 134) 
 
Like in the case of essential and vital, potential contexts such as in (23) are a 
prerequisite for dynamic modal meaning. A similar example is given in (24).  
 
 (24)  It is crucial that the blocking device, (…), is deposited at this point to ensure 
that the tubes are rendered impassable. (CB 1996, times) 
 
In (24), which is construed with an extraposed that-clause, the blocking device has to 
be deposited at a certain point in order to ensure that the fallopian tubes are rendered 
impassable. The action of depositing is necessary on SoA-internal grounds, that is, for 
the proper blocking of the tubes (in a sterilization operation). Examples (23) and (24) 
make it clear that after metaphorical projection and semantic generalization crucial 
can be used in dynamic utterances expressing a situation-internal necessity. 
In summary, in its development from premodal to modal meaning, crucial starts 
with the non-relational and non-potential meaning of ‘cross-shaped’. It then develops 
both types of meaning at once through metaphorical projection, brought about by 
Bacon’s collocation crucial instance. In a process of semantic generalization, crucial 
loses the specific collocational meaning of ‘necessary to decide between two 
hypotheses’, and comes to mean ‘decisive for’. In this meaning, it expresses dynamic 
necessity, like essential and vital in their third stage of development.  
 
 30
4.1.5 Critical from premodal to dynamic meaning. The last adjective studied in detail 
here is critical. I will propose that in its development from premodal to dynamic 
meaning two stages can be distinguished. These are the result of one semantic change, 
which involves semantic generalization and leads from its original meaning 
immediately to dynamic meaning. As put forward in Table 5, this change does not 
involve a shift in the configuration of the semantic properties of relationality and 
potentiality. It will also become clear that the development of critical has much in 
common with that of crucial discussed above. 
 
Table 5: The development of critical from premodal to modal meaning 
Stages                   → 
stage 1: 




First attestation    → critic: 1544 
critical: 1601  
(1664) 
roughly 1990 (CB) 
Meaning and  
examples              → 
‘necessary to determine the 





relationality + + 
potentiality + + 
 
The first attestation of critical in English dates from 1590, and is a derivation of 
the now obsolete adjective critic (OED, s.v. critical). Around the end of the 16th 
century, English critical has two distinct meanings. One is related to the act of 
judging, and can be paraphrased by ‘given to judging’, especially ‘given to adverse or 
unfavourable criticism’ (OED, s.v. critical). Its first attestation in the OED comes 
from Shakespeare and is given in (25). In its second sense, critical is a medical term 
and relates to the crisis or turning point of a disease (OED, s.v. critical; Barnhart 
1988: 236a). An example of this medical sense is given in (26). This sense is also the 
meaning of critic in its first attestation, which is given in (27). 
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(25)  That is some Satire keene and criticall. (OED 1590 Shakespeare, A 
midsommer nights dreame V. i. 54) 
(26) Who  will say  that the Physition in his iudgement by vrine, 
 Who will say  that the physician in his judgement by urine,  
by indicatorie and criticall daies, by Symptomes and other arguments 
by  indicatory  and critical days, by symptoms  and other arguments 
… doeth intrude into the secret prouidence of God? 
… does  intrude into the secret providence of God? 
‘Who will say that the physician in his judgement by urine, by indicatory and 
critical days, by symptoms and other arguments, intrudes into the secret 
providence of God?’ (OED 1603 Heyden, An astrological discourse in 
justification of the validity of astrology. i. 19) 
(27)  If it appeare in the vj day, being a day iudiciall or creticke of the ague. 
 if it appear  in the 6th day, being a day judicial or critic  of the ague.  
‘If it [jaundis, OED] appears on the sixth day, being a judicial or critic day of 
the ague [i.e. an acute or violent fever, AVL].’ (OED 1544 Phaer, Goeurot's 
[J.] Regiment of life [1553] Gjb) 
 
As the sense of critical in (25) does not play a role in its semantic development of 
modal meaning, I will not discuss it in more detail. The medical sense of critical (and 
critic), illustrated in (26) (and [27]), however, did play an important role in the 
development of deontic meaning, and it is taken here as the first stage (cf. Table 5).20 
This sense originates in the writings of Hippocrates (c460–377 BC), and refers to a 
changing point of a disease, a “sudden change for better or worse” (Liddell et al. 1951 
[1924]: i 997a).21 Hippocrates also introduced the concept of ‘critical days’ (krivsimoi 
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hJmevrai) as a prognostic tool (cf. [26]–[27]), with which he referred to days on which 
the illness reaches a crisis, and “which afforded and required a judgement (also 
krivsi") about its direction” (Demaitre 2003: 768).  
In his works De crisi and De diebus creticis, Galen provides the Hippocratic 
doctrine of critical days with a theoretical — astrological — foundation. He argues 
that critical days need to be calculated on the basis of a “medicinal month”, which 
derives from the orbit of the moon (Siraisi 1990: 135). Since Galen, therefore, the 
meaning of critical in the collocation critical days also involves an astrological 
component. Moreover, several studies have shown that the Galenic idea of 
iatromathematics or astrological medicine has been kept in use throughout the Middle 
Ages (e.g. Demaitre 2003), the Early Modern period (e.g. Roos 2000), and even the 
Late Modern period (e.g. Harrison 2000). Hence, it is not surprising that the first 
attestations of critic(al) in its medical (and astrological) sense typically collocate with 
days, as in (26) and (27) above. A later example is given below.  
 
(28) Another time is called Intercidental, which is a time falls out between the 
Judicial dauyes and Critical. (OED 1651 Culpepper, Semeiotica Uranica; or, 
an astrologicall judgment of diseases 22) 
 
In collocation with day(s), critical functions as a classifier, indicating a specific 
subtype of day, rather than attributing a gradable quality to its referent. The types of 
days critical ones are opposed to are intercidental and judicial or indicatory days, as 
in (26) and (28). 
The explanation of critical days above has shown that this fixed phrase has 
relational and potential meaning as a whole (cf. Table 5), just like the phrases crucial 
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instance and crucial experiment in Section 4.1.4 above. In fact, critical days can be 
paraphrased as days that are necessary to determine the direction of the disease, just 
like a crucial experiment is necessary to determine the ‘direction’ of a scientific 
theory. This condition-goal paraphrase thus implies that the collocation studied here 
involves situational dynamic meaning.  
The semantic change of critical that leads to its dynamic meaning involves 
semantic generalization through the expansion of the host-class. The data show that 
the use of critical is extended from the technical medico-astrological sense relating to 
the crisis in a disease to the more general meaning of ‘decisive for’ or ‘important for’ 
when used in modifying other nouns, just like crucial after its semantic 
generalization. In this extended sense, it is critical itself that has relational and 
potential meaning, and not critical in combination with the noun it classifies. What is 
regarded as critical has a decisive impact on the following course of events or, in 
other words, will determine the outcome of the matter talked about. The relationship 
established by critical is thus one of decisive influence or determining importance. 
The semantic generalization of critical has structural correlations in that it is able to 
take complements (see [29]–[31] below) — unlike in its collocational sense, as has 
been observed for crucial (cf. Section 4.1.4). Syntactically it does not function as a 
classifier anymore, but rather as an attribute, since it can be graded, as is illustrated in 
(29), and used in predicative position, as is illustrated in (30) and (31).  
 
(29)  Acquaint them [tender-plants, OED] gradually with the Air for this change is 
the most critical of the whole year. (OED 1664 Evelyn, Kalendarium hortense 
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(30)  The short scenes are critical to providing continuity and maintaining suspense 
and eye-catching details include flickering/strobe lighting and even 
silhouetted shadows for the bedroom scene (…). (CB 1993, ukmags) 
(31)  The demands imposed by Formula One are greater than ever, he says (…). 
The cars too, have become more difficult to handle: “It is critical to get the 
set-up right because it is so easy to lose it in a big way.” (CB 1996, times) 
 
In (29), critical is modifying this change (presumably the change between two 
seasons) and it is graded. The adjective has the meaning of ‘decisive for’, but 
arguably the sense of necessity is not that clearly present. In fact, all Early and Late 
Modern English examples are similar to (29), with critical modifying a special 
occasion or period of time. It is only in Present-day English that critical appears in 
expressions in which the sense of necessity is foregrounded as well, as in examples 
(30) and (31). In (30), the use of short scenes is critical or necessary to provide 
continuity and maintain suspense in the play. This condition-goal paraphrase, typical 
of dynamic meaning, also applies to (31). Here, getting the set-up of a Formula One 
car right is critical or necessary to take a good start in a race (and ultimately, to win 
the race). Note that in this example, the condition is encoded by a clausal 
complement. In these two cases, some action is regarded as critical or necessary to the 
achievement of a particular goal, on the basis of SoA-internal grounds. These 
examples hence show that the first modal meaning critical develops is that of 
situational dynamic meaning, much like essential, vital and crucial.  
In conclusion, critical develops dynamic modal meaning from its original 
medical-astrological meaning through semantic generalization. From its specific 
meaning of ‘necessary to decide on the direction of the disease’ in collocation with 
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days, it develops the more general meaning of ‘decisive for’. Both stages involve 
relational and potential meaning. In the dynamic modal stage, the meaning of critical 
is very similar to that of crucial in its fourth stage. It should be noted, though, that it is 
only in Present-day English that critical is used in clearly dynamic expressions, in 
which the necessity of SoAs is indicated on the basis of SoA-internal arguments. 
 
4.1.6 A second pathway to dynamic meaning: crucial and critical. From the sections 
above, we can understand that the semantic developments of crucial and critical to 
(dynamic) modal meaning run parallel. They can be represented on a single pathway 








Figure 2: The second pathway to dynamic meaning: crucial and critical 
 
Like in the case of the first pathway, the main differences between the two adjectives 
pertain to the initial stages of the respective developments. Crucial first underwent 
metaphorical projection before it could be used in its collocational meaning (as in 
crucial experiment), whereas with critical the stage of collocational meaning (critical 
days) coincides with its original stage. Importantly, in both cases the collocational 
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to resolve the crisis’ 
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relates to the development of a scientific theory, while in the case of critical, the crisis 
relates to the development of a disease. After the stage of collocational meaning, both 
adjectives develop dynamic meaning through generalization. Semantically, the type of 
relationship they establish then relates to the notion of a crisis, and can be paraphrased 
as ‘decisive for’. This change is also reflected structurally in that the adjectives can 
take complements (unlike in their collocational stages) (cf. vital in its generalized 
meaning, see Section 4.1.2). Syntactically, the adjectives no longer function as 
classifiers, but as gradable attributes, typically allowing for totality modifiers and 
predicative alternation. Thus, like in the case of essential and vital, the properties of 
relationality and potentiality can be seen as the semantic conditions for dynamic 
meaning, indicating necessity inherent in a situation. More specifically, we can 
conclude that crucial and critical illustrate a second pathway from premodal to 
(dynamic) modal meaning via the notion of a crisis, which differs from the first 
pathway exemplified by essential and vital, involving the notion of defining necessity. 
 
4.2 Change within the modal domain 
Whereas essential, vital, crucial and critical show differences in their changes from 
premodal to modal meaning — however, these could be grouped two by two in terms 
of two pathways, the adjectives all show the same change within the modal domain. 
From the dynamic meaning described as endpoint of the pathways presented above, 
all cases develop deontic meaning. The dynamic-deontic development has also been 
noted for modal auxiliaries with some cross-linguistic frequency (cf. Bybee et al. 
1994, Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998). Importantly, however, the type of 
dynamic meaning involved differs. Whereas the modal auxiliaries first undergo 
micro-changes within the dynamic domain from participant-inherent (ability) to 
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participant-imposed meaning before developing deontic meaning (e.g., Van Ostaeyen 
and Nuyts 2004: 113),22 the adjectives studied here develop only one type of dynamic 
meaning which leads to deontic meaning, viz. situational meaning. While these 
dynamic adjectival expressions indicate necessities that are internal to the SoAs 
referred to, deontic expressions involve an attitudinal source (typically the speaker) in 
whose view a certain action is assessed as necessary or desirable on the basis of 
(moral) arguments that are external to the SoA (see Section 2). In this sense, the 
change from dynamic to deontic meaning involves the process of subjectification as 
defined by Traugott (1989: 35), in which “meanings tend to become increasingly 
based in the speaker’s subjective belief state/attitude toward the proposition”. 
Specifically, deontic expressions are subjective in that they enact the speaker’s 
position with regard to the situation (cf. De Smet and Verstraete 2006: 387).23 The 
first deontic utterance appears with essential in the first half of the 19th century, and is 
shown in (32). Examples (33) to (35) illustrate deontic uses of vital, crucial and 
critical, only found in the Present-day English data.  
As can be seen in (35), in their deontic meaning the adjectives are still gradable, 
since they can combine with the totality modifier absolutely — just like in their 
dynamic meaning. However, in their change from dynamic to deontic meaning, the 
adjectives also change in the type of opposition they imply (cf. Paradis 2001: 51–54). 
In dynamic uses, the adjectives are complementaries, “conceptualized in terms or 
‘either … or’” (Paradis 2001: 52) (either necessary or not necessary/avoidable). In 
deontic uses, by contrast, the adjectives are antonymic and they imply a scale (in this 
case one of [moral] desirability), on which they appear at one extreme (with at the 
other end adjectives such as, e.g., unacceptable). According to the types of gradable 
adjectives proposed in Paradis (2001: 51–54), they thus change from ‘limit adjectives’ 
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to ‘extreme adjectives’, which is a shift from non-scalar to scalar. Therefore, they 
confirm Paradis’s (2001: 58) finding that adjectives tend to get scalar interpretations.  
 
(32) The Anglo-Catholics consider it essential to be ordained by bishops receiving 
their appointment in regular succession from the apostles. (OED 1842 Gell, 
Serm. Visitation Archdeacon of Derby 33) 
(33) It is vital that the European Community helps the process of transition to 
market economies, preparing these countries for eventual EC membership. 
(CB 1992, ukephem) 
(34) With the scourge of illegal narcotics infecting every part of the world, it is 
crucial to educate young people about the dangers of drugs. (CB 1998, 
sunnow) 
(35) “The most important thing is to sharpen the focus of the young generation so 
that they are better able to identify racism and totalitarianism in its early 
stages,” he said. “In the battle against this fundamental evil of the twentieth 
century, it is absolutely critical to mount a timely resistance.” (CB 1996, 
times) 
 
As the diachronic corpora provide too few examples of deontic expressions, we 
can only start from the synchronic data to hypothesize how the change took place, i.e. 
how the process of subjectification worked. Since situational dynamic and deontic 
expressions merely differ in the presence or absence of an attitudinal source (see also 
Van linden 2009: 283–209), it is the interpretation of the presence of an attitudinal 
source that must have arisen as an invited inference. Crucially, this presence need not 
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be overtly or structurally marked in the complement constructions studied here. 
Therefore, it may be argued that the invited inference arose in the following contexts.  
 
(36)  This should make you want to go to the toilet frequently. Although it may sting 
the first few times you go, this usually gets better the more water you pass. It 
is essential to keep emptying the bladder if you are to flush out the germs. (CB 
1992, ukepehm) 
(37)  We must persuade our mps to support the Bill - it's a Private Member's Bill, 
and so it is essential that at least 100 MPs support it, or it will get thrown out 
without a second reading. (CB 1995, ukephem) 
 
Example (36) repeats (2) above. In Section 2, I argued that the necessity expressed by 
its condition-goal structure resides in the nature of things, viz. the physical make-up 
of the urinary system. The structure in (37) indicates the need to have the support of 
100 MPs in order to give the Wild Mammals (Protection) Bill a second reading 
(which is ultimately needed to have the bill passed). Here, the necessity expressed by 
the condition-goal structure resides in a self-imposed system, viz. the parliamentary 
system of Great Britain. In both examples, however, it is possible to see involvement 
of an attitudinal source. Example (37) can be interpreted as ‘within the parliamentary 
system it is necessary that at least 100MPs support the bill to give it a second reading, 
and I think it is essential that this happens, because I feel it is highly desirable that we 
protect wild animals’. (36) can be understood as ‘it is essential to keep emptying the 
bladder if you are to flush out the germs, and I think you should flush them out 
because you should keep yourself in good health’. In the clearly deontic examples 
given in (32) to (35), however, the necessities cannot be felicitously interpreted to 
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reside in the nature of things or in a self-imposed system anymore. This is especially 
clear in (32), in which the necessity is related to the syntactic subject of the complex 
transitive matrix construction (the Anglo-Catholics). Note also that the expressions in 
(32) to (35) do not (implicitly or explicitly) refer to a concrete goal to which the SoAs 
expressed in the complements are said to be essential, vital, crucial or critical. 
Therefore, the examples show that the invited inference of the presence of an 
attitudinal source has semanticized or conventionalized (cf. Traugott 1989; Evans and 
Wilkins 2000: 549–550; Traugott and Dasher 2002: 34–40; Enfield 2003: 28–30): the 
more subjective scalar deontic meaning has become part of the meaning of the 
adjectives in addition their non-scalar dynamic meaning. 
 
5. Conclusion24 
In this article on the diachrony of modal expressions, I have elaborated on two topics 
which have received much attention in that domain, viz. sources of modal forms and 
pathways of change. Whereas these topics have typically been investigated on the 
basis of modal auxiliaries, both in language-specific and in cross-linguistic accounts, I 
have taken the perspective of an under-researched category in this domain, viz. 
adjectives. Even though the adjectives studied, viz. four borrowed items of Romance 
origin, belong to a different register than the modal auxiliaries, as rightly noted by a 
referee, they proved interesting and offered new insights, which are visualized in 
Figure 3.  
Firstly, the adjectives focused on in this article, viz. essential, vital, crucial and 
critical, add new items to the lists of sources of deontic meaning presented in 


















Figure 3: The sources and pathways of change of deontic adjectives 
 
express abstract notions (crisis, essence, and life) or concrete objects (cross). It was 
also noted that many adjectives expressing a weak degree of desirability in the deontic 
domain, such as proper, appropriate, fitting and meet, by contrast, can etymologically 
be related to cross-linguistically recurrent sources of obligation or strong deontic 
meaning, such as possession and measure (Bybee et al. 1994: 182–183; Traugott and 
Dasher 2002: 118–119; Heine and Kuteva 2002: 333). 
Secondly, this study of adjectives has expanded on well-known pathways of 
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the dynamic-deontic pathway, which has been proposed for modal auxiliaries already 
(e.g. Bybee et al. 1994: 191–194; Goossens 1999; Traugott and Dasher 20002: Ch. 3). 
Although the dynamic stages may differ for the verbal and adjectival expressions, as 
discussed in Section 4.2, in both cases the process of subjectification re-orients the 
property of necessity from the situation (necessity imposed by or internal to a 
particular situation) to the attitudinal source (necessity as judged by someone, 
typically the speaker, on the basis of SoA-external, moral principles). It should be 
noted, though, that subjectification is a metonymically based semantic process that 
does not systematically correlate with certain formal or structural properties. The 
diachronic analysis presented here therefore suggests that the distinction between 
dynamic and deontic modal meaning (in the upper part of Figure 3) may not always 
be clear-cut, unlike the stages in the developments from premodal to modal meaning. 
What is even more interesting than the dynamic-deontic change within the modal 
domain, is the very changes from premodal to modal meaning. It is especially in this 
subdomain that the investigation of adjectives fills a gap in the literature. More 
specifically, it has been shown that with adjectives the development of (situational 
dynamic) modal meaning is a matter of the properties of relationality and potentiality. 
Relationality is needed to turn the adjective into a predicate of necessity that can link 
two concepts, for instance a part and a whole, or a condition and a goal. Accordingly, 
it was shown that relational meaning is the semantic condition for the development of 
potential meaning. Potentiality, in turn, is needed to ensure that the relationship 
established by the adjective is one of indispensability or decisive influence rather than 
intrinsic inclusion, and hence, that the necessity involved is dynamic-modal rather 
than defining. We can therefore assume that the semantic properties of relationality 
and potentiality are the conditions of entry into the modal domain.  
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In addition, it became clear that the adjectives show some substantial differences 
in the development of these properties. Although in their original stages, they all 
function as classifiers, they differ in terms of the configuration of semantic properties. 
In particular, essential and crucial start off with non-relational and non-potential 
meaning, whereas vital starts off with relational meaning and critical even with both 
relational and potential meaning. It has also been shown that the factors driving the 
emergence of relationality can be quite different: patterns of co-occurrence with 
relational nouns in the case of essential, as opposed to metaphorical projection, 
metonymy and semantic generalization in the case of crucial. For the emergence of 
potential meaning, the same mechanisms were invoked in the case of crucial, whereas 
in the case of critical, only the mechanism of semantic generalization (through 
expansion of the host-class) applied. In the cases of essential and vital, by contrast, 
potential meaning emerged through patterns of co-occurrence with evaluative 
adjectives and potential actions. These mechanisms all indicate the importance of 
constructions in the development of a particular lexical item. We can thus conclude 
that the developments of the properties of relationality and potentiality, which 
themselves are new in the diachronic research of modal categories, involve more 
general mechanisms of change which are not that new, but have already been invoked 
for a varied set of semasiological extensions in distinct conceptual categories (cf. 
Geeraerts 1997: 93–102).   
Still with regard to the properties of relationality and potentiality, it can be argued 
that they function on different levels: the development of relationality seems to be 
mainly a lexical matter, while the development of potentiality seems to be on a 
constructional rather than a lexical level. In the cases of essential and crucial, for 
instance, the change from non-relational to relational meaning involves the largest 
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semantic leap (from meanings that do not involve necessity to meanings that do). 
Moreover, the emergence of relationality precedes the development of potentiality, 
most clearly so in the semantic extension of essential and vital. The changes involving 
potential meaning, and further on to deontic meaning, by contrast, involve smaller 
semantic developments (from one type of necessity to another).  
Most importantly, this study has generalized over the differences in the 
development of the semantic properties of relationality and potentiality, and it has 
presented two distinct pathways of change from premodal to modal meaning, as 
shown in Figure 3. One pathway involves the notion of defining necessity and is 
followed by essential and vital. The second pathway involves the notion of a crisis, 
and is followed by crucial and critical. From a broader perspective, the two pathways 
can also serve as the basis of a more elaborate typology of pathways to deontic 
meaning. In this article, a few concepts were introduced that may prove useful in 
further explorations of the diachrony of modal categories, such as the features of 
relationality and potentiality. Apart from the borrowed adjectives discussed in this 
article, it may be interesting to look at native adjectives also, such as needful, which 
may present us with yet other pathways to deontic meaning (from ‘poor, needy’ over 
‘necessary, indispensable’ [OED, s.v. needful] to ‘morally desirable’). It is hoped that 
further research can expand this preliminary typology of adjectival pathways to 
deontic meaning. However, before we can build on this typology, we need to 
strengthen its foundations by adducing quantitative evidence for the developments 
proposed in this article, drawn from larger datasets. 
Other questions for further reflection, as suggested by a referee, may include the 
application of the concepts of relationality and potentiality to other categories than 
adjectives, such as, for instance, the modal auxiliaries. If we take a closer look at the 
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premodal stages of the modals, can we draw parallels with the adjectives? Or can we 
perhaps draw cross-linguistic parallels? 
Finally, another concept that deserves further investigation is that of gradability. 
In the developments of the adjectives, we noted a change from non-gradable classifier 
uses to gradable attribute uses, which is consistent with the unidirectional tendency 
posited by Paradis (2001: 58). Within the modal domain, we noted a further change 
from limit adjectives to extreme adjectives, or from non-scalar to scalar gradable 
items. This finding also complies with the observation that adjectives tend to develop 
scalar interpretations (Paradis 2001: 58). Perhaps the study of adjectives in other 
modal domains, such as certain or true in the epistemic domain, may reveal similar 
changes and thus present us with other contexts in which shifts from non-gradable to 
gradable take place. 
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 Of course, as suggested by a referee, other scholars have already pointed out that adjectives can have 
modal meanings as well, such as Nuyts (2001) for Dutch waarschijnlijk and German wahrscheinlich 
(both ‘probable’), and Shindo (2008) for clear. These adjectives, however, express epistemic meanings, 
whereas the adjectives focused on in this article express deontic meanings. 
2
 Agent-oriented or root meaning includes ability, desire, root possibility, obligation and necessity 
(Bybee et al. 1994: 177–179). 
3
 However, Narrog (2005) presents Japanese data which do not comply with the agent-oriented > 
epistemic pathway. Instead, he proposes an overarching tendency for modal expressions to change 
from event-oriented (largely identical with agent-oriented) to speaker-oriented meaning. 
4
 As suggested by a referee, Depraetere and Reed (2006: 281–282) provide a useful overview of how 
dynamic modality is treated in the literature. 
5
 Likewise, the expressions for obligation in Chepang (Sino-Tibetan) and Temne (Niger-Congo) as 
well as the English semi-modals have to and have got to, and the Spanish forms haber de and tener que 
also derive from the notion of possession (Bybee et al. 1994: 182–184). 
6
 In addition, the expression for obligation in Danish (må) (Bybee et al. 1994: 182) and the English 
modal auxiliary *motan (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 122) also derive from the notion of measure, just 
like the Dutch past participle gepast  and its German counterpart angemessen (both ‘fitting’). In Dutch, 
the present participle of the same verb passen (‘fit’), viz. passend, can also be used to translate fitting. 
7
 The Old French period is generally taken to last until 1350, so it possible that vital was borrowed 
from continental Old French. However, in view of the sociolinguistic situation in Britain during the 
Middle English period, it is more likely that vital was borrowed from Anglo-Norman than from Old 
French, if the source is not Latin (see Rothwell 1998). 
8
 As noted by a referee, these sources are non-native from the perspective of English. Therefore, the 
adjectives belong to a different register than the English modal auxiliaries, which can be traced back to 
cross-linguistically recurrent sources. I will briefly return to this issue in Section 5. 
9
 This section is based on Van linden et al. (2008: 231–240). 
10
 Classifiers can be opposed to attributes, which assign a (typically gradable) quality to the instance 
referred to by the NP, as new in a new car, or beautiful in a beautiful car) (Bolinger 1967: 14–20; 
Teyssier 1968: 225–249; Halliday 1994: 184–186). Unlike attributes, classifiers can only occur in 
prenominal position and never appear predicatively. Further, since classifiers do not attribute a quality 
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to the referent of the NP, but rather modify the reference of the head noun (Bolinger 1967: 14–15), they 
are not gradable, i.e., they “do not accept degrees of comparison or intensity” (Halliday 1994: 185). 
11
 Relational nouns like these are different from other nouns in that they make schematic reference to 
another thing (the whole), and have the conception of a relationship with this other thing as a 
background (the part-whole relationship), just like the noun father (the male parent) makes schematic 
reference to offspring on the basis of the parent-offspring relationship (cf. Langacker 1991: 38–39). 
12
 Note that this is highly determined by the speaker’s Weltanschauung. An ancient Greek speaker, for 
example, would not see mercy as an essential attribute of god (e.g., Zeus). 
13
 In their typology of subjectivity, De Smet and Verstraete (2006: 387) term this type of subjective 
meaning “ideational semantic subjectivity”. This type is different from the subjective meaning 
conveyed in deontic expressions, which involves the enactment of the speaker’s position towards the 
situation, and is labelled “interpersonal semantic subjectivity” in De Smet and Verstraete (2006: 386) 
(see Section 4.2). 
14
 In the data, the earliest instances of vital in this more general meaning of ‘essential to’ are few. 
Therefore, the semantic developments proposed here are not necessarily consistent with the chronology 
of the attestations (cf. dates of first attestations in Table 3). 
15
 However, as suggested by Hubert Cuyckens (pc), it might be argued that the collocation from which 
the process of generalization starts (viz. vital parts) provides a ‘shortcut’ to potential meaning, as it 
already indexes the property of potentiality. More precisely, the collocation can also be paraphrased as 
parts that are “necessary to life; performing the functions indispensable to the maintenance of life” 
(OED, s.v. vital). This potential element can be thought of as an invited inference, which is later 
semanticized (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 34–40). Paraphrases involving potentiality can also be used 
for examples which are comparable to those in (16) and (17) above, but which involve more concrete 
noun referents that are heterogeneous in substance. Examples are given below. 
(i)  To preserve intact such vital parts as the machinery, magazines, and steering gear. (OED 
1889 Welch, Naval Architecture 141) 
(ii)  Spring washers are less effective, but answer well enough for the less vital parts of the 
mechanism. (OED 1912 Motor Man. (ed. 14) 206) 
In these examples, vital can be paraphrased as ‘necessary to its proper working’. However, the fact that 
such examples are attested rather late (i.e., after the instances with evaluative adjectives and potential 
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actions), and the prior occurrence of defining examples such as (16) and (17) above together suggest 
that vital developed along the same lines as essential. Of course, the invited inference of potential 
meaning may have paved the way for the constructions discussed here to emerge. 
16
 This section is based on Van linden et al. (2008: 240–244). 
17
 It can be argued that this metaphor has a metonymical basis, as the instances in question are not 
cross-like, but rather situated at crosses posted at bifurcations of the road. This relation of spatial 
contiguity thus serves as the base for the metaphor, which is in keeping with Barcelona’s claim that the 
target and/or the source of a potential metaphor “must be understood or perspectivized metonymically 
for the metaphor to be possible” (Barcelona 2000: 31; italics his). I thank Hubert Cuyckens for pointing 
this out to me. 
18
 The question whether the emergence of the metaphorized meaning in English is a language-internal 
development or the result of another borrowing does not concern us here. 
19
 The Latin phrases appeared in earlier scientific or philosophical English writings (e.g., The gradual 
removal of these suspicions at length led me to the Experimentum crucis (OED 1672 Newton, Light & 
Colours i); The Experimentum crucis or that Experiment, which points out the Way we should follow, 
in any Doubt or Ambiguity (OED 1751 Hume, An enquiry concerning the principles of morals V. ii. 
84)). 
20
 It is also in this sense that the adjective was borrowed first into Latin and later into French, English 
and German (FEW II2: 1354b–1355b; Koselleck 2006: 358–363). 
21
 Such a crisis usually involves the sudden excretion of “bad humours”, for instance through heavy 
sweat during fever, vomiting, diarrhea or menstruation (Siraisi 1990: 135). 
22
 In their diachronic study of the Dutch modal kunnen (‘can’), Van Ostaeyen and Nuyts (2004) argue 
on the basis of the distribution of ambiguous cases that deontic meaning seems to have developed from 
participant-imposed dynamic meaning, and epistemic meaning from situational dynamic meaning 
(2004: 52). 
23
 In De Smet and Verstraete’s (2006: 386) typology of subjectivity, this type of subjective meaning is 
called “interpersonal semantic subjectivity” (cf. Section 4.1.1, note 13). 
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